Throughout the writings known familiarly as the Jena Wissenschaftslehre , Fichte defends a unified and comprehensive explanatory hypothesis for consciousness. The structure and content of all intentional relations are initiated by and grounded upon the free self-activity of what Fichte calls the I. This is Fichte's principal idealist thesis, which emerges from his expansion of Kant's transcendental apperception thesis.
1 This selfactivity is self-determination, which produces the form and content of all acts of consciousness, including consciousness of independently existing objects. Fichte's hypothesis contains two theses:
For all cases in which a subject S represents an object X, where X is 1.
an object of a perception, a thought, or a practical aim, S's representation of X and the manner in which (propositional attitude) S represents X is S's free yet law-governed self-determination to represent X in the way S represents X. For all instances of (1), S has an immediate, nonintentional conscious-2. ness of her freely initiated self-determination to represent X.
Thesis (1) establishes a single, comprehensive experience explanatory condition (EEC): all acts of consciousness -the initial establishing of an intentional relation, the nature of that relation, and the form and content of what is represented; in sum, all determination of objects -are derived from and accompanied by freely initiated self-determination to represent an object in a determinate way. All consciousness is a freely self-determined, determinate way of acting. Thesis (2) states a consciousness condition (CC): in all cases in which one represents an object, one In this chapter I assess Fichte's case for (2) and its complement (CC) and defend it against a prominent objection by Christian Klotz.
3 I argue that the nonintentional consciousness of self-determination, which Fichte terms immediate self-consciousness and to which one has access by intellectual intuition, is a tacit, performative awareness of one's acting intrinsic to all acts of consciousness. I also argue, however, that performative awareness cannot bear the burden of Fichte's argument for (2) and thus (CC).
This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I offer a brief account of what partly motivates Fichte's defense of (1) and (EEC). A crucial motivation for his case against dogmatism is a concern to preserve the irreducible reality of certain phenomenal features of consciousness presupposed by (1) and (EEC). My account and the entire chapter assumes an interpretation of self-positing without defending it. By self-positing, I mean selfinitiating self-determination, and by sich setzen als setzend , I mean freely initiated self-determination as determining oneself to a specific manner of acting (representing) . Secondly, I analyze Fichte's regress argument in Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (in Daniel Breazeale's translation, IWL ) and Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo ( WLnm ) as an Agrippan argument designed to establish a foundationalist solution to the problem the argument uncovers; namely, that a nonintentional selfconsciousness underwrites and accompanies all consciousness. Against Klotz's objection, I defend the view that what Fichte means by nonintentional self-consciousness is a coherent form of conscious awareness and that it is best read as a tacit performative awareness. I conclude by arguing that what performative awareness reveals is phenomenologically insufficient to account for our everyday experience and, accordingly, that (2) and (CC) have a defeater for which Fichte proposes no solution. Thus, Fichte's defense of (2) and (CC) fails by his own standards by being inconsistent with what is disclosed in experience.
Fichte treats dogmatism as a rival explanatory hypothesis, which must, like any explanatory hypothesis, satisfy two criteria: it must be (a) comprehensive and (b) unitary. That is, it must explain all components of consciousness on the basis of a single principle. Dogmatism's principle is a causal thesis: all determinations of consciousness -all mental
